The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany
Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.
Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion
1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)
1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)
1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.
2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.
财政部关于印发《中外合作会计师事务所管理暂行办法》的通知
财政部
财政部关于印发《中外合作会计师事务所管理暂行办法》的通知
1996年3月28日，财政部
各省、自治区、直辖市财政厅（局）：
现将《中外合作会计师事务所管理暂行办法》印发给你们，请遵照执行。执行中有何问题，望及时告我部。中国注册会计师协会将在近期内，对中外合作会计师事务所进行一次普查，并按本暂行办法的规定进行整顿，尽快使中国会计市场的对外开放纳入规范化、法制化的轨道。
附件：中外合作会计师事务所管理暂行办法
第一章 总 则
第一条 根据《中华人民共和国注册会计师法》第四十四条的规定，制定本办法。
第二条 中外合作会计师事务所是经中国政府批准的、由国际会计师事务所或境外会计师事务所（以下简称合作外方）与境内会计师事务所（以下简称合作中方）在中国境内合作设立的会计师事务所（以下简称合作所）。合作所的一切活动，必须遵守中国的法律、法规的有关规定。
第三条 依照《中华人民共和国注册会计师法》的规定，合作所必须加入中国注册会计师协会，成为其团体会员，并接受其自律管理。
第四条 依照《中华人民共和国注册会计师法》的规定，合作所设立的批准机关为财政部。
第五条 财政部授权中国注册会计师协会办理审查、批准以及监督、管理合作所的有关事务。中国注册会计师协会可授权合作所所在地的省级注册会计师协会对其日常活动进行监督、管理。
第二章 合作所的设立
第六条 申请举办合作所必须具备以下条件：
（一）合作外方：
1．具有先进专业技术和良好的信誉；
2．年收入不少于2000万美元；
3．审计专业人员不少于200人。
（二）合作中方：
1．在国内同行业中有较高的专业水平和较好的服务信誉；
2．与原挂靠单位在职能、人员、财务上脱钩；
3．具有从事执行证券业务的相关资格；
4．年收入不少于1000万元人民币；
5．审计专业人员不少于100人。
第七条 申请成立合作所的程序：
（一）通过合作中方所在地的省级财政部门向中国注册会计师协会提交下列申请文件：
1．申请报告；
2．所在地省级人民政府的批复；
3．合作双方签定的合作协议；
4．合作双方签定的经营合同；
5．合作双方签定的合作所章程；
6．可行性分析报告；
7．拟任董事会成员的有效证明及其简历；
8．拟任高级管理人员的有效证明及其简历；
9．拟加入合作所的中国注册会计师人员名单、简历及有关证件复印件；
10．办公场所租赁协议或使用权证明文件；
11．中、外各方合法开业证书副本；
12．中、外双方出资证明。
中国注册会计师协会接到上述申请文件后进行审查，并报请财政部在30天内作出批准或者不批准的决定。
（二）申请者接到财政部批准的决定后，通过合作中方所在地的省级外经贸管理部门向对外经济贸易合作部报送下列文件，申请外商投资企业批准证书：
1．申请报告；
2．可行性分析报告；
3．协议、合同、章程；
4．董事长、副董事长、董事人选名单；
5．财政部的批准文件。
（三）经批准成立的合作所，应在取得批准证书后1个月内，到所在地工商行政管理部门及税务部门办理工商登记和税务登记手续。
第三章 合作所的管理
第八条 合作所一经批准成立，即是一个新的独立的会计师事务所，合作所内双方在中国境内均不得以原会计师事务所的名义从事法定的审计业务。
第九条 中国企业境内上市外资股的审计报告，应由中国注册会计师签发；境外承销机构要求境外会计师出具的审计报告，只在境外具有效力。所有在中国境内从事的审计业务，均应由合作所统一承揽、统一收取费用、统一进行核算、统一保管档案、统一安排人员。
第十条 中国企业在境外上市，其在中国境内生效的审计报告，应由中国注册会计师签发；境外证券机构要求境外会计师签署的报告，仅在境外具有效力。境外上市企业在中国境内的法定审计工作，均应由合作所统一承揽、统一收取费用、统一进行核算、统一管理档案、统一安排人员。
第十一条 合作所应于每年2月20日前，向中国注册会计师协会报送上年度承接上市公司审计项目一览表（见附表1），接受中国注册会计师协会对其执行业务的监督、检查。
第十二条 合作所应于每年2月20日前，向中国注册会计师协会报送所有注册会计师名单（见附表2），接受中国注册会计师协会对其人员变动情况的监督、检查。
第十三条 合作所主要负责人的变动，应经董事会批准，并报中国注册会计师协会备案。
第十四条 合作所因业务需要聘用外方人员，须经中外双方业务负责人同意，并报中国注册会计师协会备案（见附表3、4）。
第十五条 合作所应按中国注册会计师协会后续教育的有关要求，制定培训计划，组织培训工作，并于每年2月20日前向中国注册会计师协会报告上年度培训情况（见附表5）。
第十六条 合作所的中国注册会计师，应按中国注册会计师协会的要求，统一接受年检。
第十七条 合作所应根据《中华人民共和国会计法》的要求，设立财务会计部门，配备专职财会人员，保持完整的财务会计记录，并按财政部发布的《会计师事务所财务管理若干问题的暂行规定》和《会计师事务所会计核算办法》进行日常核算，编制会计报表，依法聘请本所以外的中国注册会计师查帐验证并出具报告。
第十八条 合作所在中国境内从事业务的一切财务收支，均应纳入合作所会计帐目进行核算，并按中国有关税法的要求依法纳税。
第十九条 合作双方应采取积极有效措施，加快合作所向合作外方国际成员所的过渡。本办法实施前已经成立的合作所，其向国际成员所过渡的时间，自本办法公布后，最长不得超过5年。
第四章 合作所的分支机构
第二十条 合作所因业务需要，可以申请成立分所。
合作所的分所，系指在合作所总部所在地以外的省级行政区域设立的分支机构。分所系非独立法人单位，以总所名义对外执行业务，接受总所的监督、指导，总所对分所执行的业务承担责任；分所的主要负责人由合作所董事会任命，并报中国注册会计师协会备案。
分所名称，应采用“总所名称＋地名＋分所”的称谓。
第二十一条 合作所申请设立分所，应当具备以下条件：
（一）总所已达到以下要求：
1．董事会正常运转；
2．中、外方总经理职能正常行使；
3．中方经理级专业人员在全部经理级人员中至少达到50％；
4．总所近3年财务会计工作符合有关财务会计法规的规定；
5．近3年没有违法和违规行为。
（二）分所符合下列条件：
1．有10名以上国家规定职龄以内的中方专职从业人员，其中至少有5名是中国注册会计师；
2．有必须的营运资金；
3．有固定的办公场所。
第二十二条 合作所申请设立分所时，应当报送以下申请文件：
1．申请报告；
2．符合第二十一条所列要求的书面情况报告；
3．董事会对分所主要负责人的任命书；
4．中国注册会计师及双方管理人员名单、简历及有关证明；
5．办公场所的产权或使用权证明文件。
第二十三条 分所的申请与批准程序与总所相同。
第二十四条 设立分所后，其所在地的境外会计师事务所常驻代表机构应在3个月内撤销。
第二十五条 本办法自公布之日起施行。
附：1—5（略）
